Charting a course for Afghanistan by Jacob Townsend
1 The Rudd Government has inherited plans for a military build-up and a rising aid budget in 
 Afghanistan. In December, the Defence Minister, Joel Fitzgibbon, assessed that ‘We 
 are winning the battles and not the war...We have been very successful in clearing areas 
 of the Taliban but it’s having no real strategic effect.’ In part, that’s because the ‘war’ is 
 a state-building project. To have lasting effect, it must establish a functional government
 that can compete successfully for legitimacy and territory with its predecessor, the Taliban.
 Our alliance and counter-terrorism interests currently point in the same direction. We need
 a legitimate Afghan government that can lead the counter-insurgency campaign, a 
 campaign whose success depends on external events and which stretches well into 
 the future.
 With an ongoing insurgency, military assistance is necessary to control territory for the 
 Kabul Government. However, governance is ultimately a civilian affair and sustainable
 success in Afghanistan requires different mixes of military and non-military tools across
 a country divided between west–north and east–south. In areas of active insurgency, we 
 should hold the line through force and rapid reconstruction projects. Behind the line, we
 should work on governance, 
 prioritising law and order.
 NATO has begun reviewing its aid and
 military strategies for the next 3–5 years.1 
 The following analysis offers a 15-year 
 vision for Afghanistan and derives from 
 it a medium-term strategy for assistance, 
 leading to recommendations on 
 Australia’s role.
 The story so far – military confl ict
 As of 5 December 2007, thirty-nine 
 countries were contributing 41,700 troop
 to Afghanistan (see fi gure 1),2 not 
 including 7,000 soldiers under the 
 separate command of Operation 
 Enduring Freedom. Australia is one of a   
 handful of countries operating in the 
 dangerous south (see fi gure 2).
 49,000 soldiers are too few for the 
 ambitious objective of controlling territory   
 and pacifying a signifi cant insurgency. 
 The  continuing challenge induced most 
 countries to increase their deployments in  
 2007. This was a positive—and 
 somewhat unexpected—outcome of 
 alliance politics. Georgian troops not yet deployed
Source: NATO
Figure 1: Troops in Afghanistan
(5 December 2007)
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Involvement in Afghanistan remains vaguely unpopular in many NATO publics and fi rmly 
unpopular in a few. 2008 is a crunch year: demonstrable progress will sustain momentum; 
perceptions of stagnation will likely initiate withdrawals.
Australia has followed the trend, with belated recognition that Afghanistan’s history of 
militarism is not amenable to a quick fi x (see fi gure 3). On current plans, the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) contingent will exceed 1,000 in mid-2008. 
NATO confronts a fl uid opposition, including transnational jihadis, drug barons and warlords. 
Some of these have fought on all sides over decades of confl ict. The diffi culty of defi ning 
this spectrum of opponents has spawned the term ‘anti-coalition militia’ (ACM). An important 
point of consistency is that all groups rely heavily on locals for foot soldiers. Many fi ghters 
are part-time and will change sides or stand down when confronted with inducements or 
costs.
As a rough guide, around a quarter of the ACM are full-time insurgents. They are the 
leadership and dedicated cadre of the Taliban, a traditionally Pashtun organisation that has 
trended towards greater transnationalism since losing power in Afghanistan. The Taliban 
operates mostly in the south and east and opposes any foreign presence in Pashtun areas. 
If successful there, they would become expansionist. 
Figure 2: Primary deployments of NATO members
Source: NATO
Figure 3: ADF Personnel in Afghanistan, 2001–07
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Another quarter of the ACM is spread across the country and resists Kabul out of concerns 
for local power, often linked to drug revenues. Such people are rarely motivated by religion, 
although they use traditional power structures and cultural justifi cations for rebellion. 
Sensitive to the winds of fortune, they will partner with the government or jihadis as their 
interests dictate.
The remaining 50% of ACM numbers would don an Afghan National Army (ANA) shirt if 
conditions were attractive. Most of them are in the south and east. Pay, power and prestige 
induce them to take direction from local warlords and/or the Taliban. They snipe and lay 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for a wage and participate in the drug trade as an 
economic opportunity. To a greater extent in Pashtun areas, their motivations may include 
personal loss or hostility to cultural encroachment. Ultimately, productive employment will 
drain their numbers.
Given the nature of the ACM, high-level political negotiation will not be successful. At the 
top, many Taliban leaders would gladly shift base from Pakistan if offered control of southern 
provinces. However, they would not abandon designs on Kabul and would not facilitate 
development in Pashtun areas.
As for local power-holders or power-seekers that occasionally associate with the Taliban out 
of expedience, negotiations are continuous. Many of them have a stake in the formal 
political system and in the north and west they have little interest in southern violence. The 
ongoing development of national political structures will reduce further their incentives for 
armed resistance. 
In the south, however, their cost-benefi t framework is radically different, as it may include 
physical threats from the Taliban and cash from opium cultivation. The coalition struggles to 
provide security for or deliver inducements to would-be collaborators, who therefore stand 
aside or assist the insurgency. With troops spread thinly, NATO has often not stayed in 
southern districts long enough to disburse non-drug wealth and protect those who show 
loyalty.
Finally, for the 
locally-recruited bulk of 
the ACM, ‘negotiations’ 
require territorial control 
and development. 
Mercenary fi ghting is a 
time-honoured income in 
Afghanistan and this 
source of insurgents will be 
a problem until other 
opportunities are 
available. Notably, reports 
from the south suggest 
that the Taliban offer higher 
salaries than the ANA.3  
In the face of continuing 
insurgency, coalition 
fatalities have been
 increasing steadily 
(see fi gure 4). Note that 
‘hostile’ includes indirect attacks such as land mines and IEDs, as well as friendly fi re.
However, aggregate fi gures obscure the geographical concentration of confl ict. Divided by 
NATO’s regional commands, almost 90% of coalition combat casualties have occurred in the 
south and east. Proximity to Pakistan and the strength of Pashtun nationalism are strongly 
correlated with the number of fatalities. The north and west are unstable but not hostile to 
international assistance.
Counting international casualties is a poor way to judge prospects for long-term stability. 
Each NATO member naturally focuses on its troops’ safety, but the more important predictor 
of success is local enthusiasm for the government. 
Opinion polls in Afghanistan return low support for the Taliban and surprisingly resilient 
support for international forces and the government in Kabul.4 However, their 
methodological limitations warrant caution when interpreting the results. 
Figure 4: Cumulative coalition casualties, 2001–07
Source: icasualty.org
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Nevertheless, if local opinion is 
important, civilian casualties should 
be avoided and military tactics should 
refl ect the strategic objective of winning 
public support. This balance of aims 
appears to have been forgotten or 
badly calculated in numerous incidents 
instigated by the coalition. Legitimacy 
is undermined, although in keeping 
with the practice of not tracking civilian 
deaths, the coalition makes it diffi cult to 
assess negative impacts.
The insurgency has made similar 
mistakes, particularly in escalating 
suicide attacks, which were unheard of 
in Afghanistan before 2001 
(see fi gure 5). Generally, governments 
can function in the face of endemic 
terrorism and suicide bombers rarely threaten territorial control. Moreover, the tactic has a 
tendency to backfi re: in 2007, suicide attacks killed 300 civilians but only 12 NATO soldiers.5 
Just as indiscriminate coalition bombing reduces support for international intervention, 
civilian casualties from suicide attacks erode the legitimacy of the ACM. Insurgency 
commanders acknowledge this downside by occasionally issuing apologies.
Opium
Another security issue is opium and 
again it is concentrated geographically 
(see fi gure 6). Across Afghanistan, 
cultivation, production, processing and 
traffi cking create power bases outside 
the formal economic and political systems. 
One outcome is the fragmentation of 
governance structures between those that 
the coalition supports and those that thrive 
on illicit activities.
Opium was a primary source of fi nance for 
the Taliban regime and production 
expanded to 8,200 tons in 2007 (fi gure 7).6 
Coalition fatalities, opium cultivation and 
ACM infl uence are spatially correlated. 
Cultivation creates a symbiosis between 
insurgents and opium farmers: the 
insurgency derives funds from opium 
and farmers fear a loss of income if the 
government has its way.
Encouragingly, the number of poppy-free provinces increased to thirteen in 2007. These 
are areas where improved governance, promises of aid and negotiated eradication of crops 
have encouraged compliance with the law. In order to sustain this trajectory, the national 
government and international donors need to demonstrate quickly the benefi ts they can 
deliver.
Some observers have suggested that opium should be legalised, bought by donors and 
distributed to developing countries as medicinal opiates.7 This strategy has two major fl aws. 
First, according to the International Narcotics Control Board—which licenses opium 
cultivation—the global supply of medicinal opiates has exceeded demand since 1999.
Second, major producing areas are outside government control. It would be impossible to 
enforce a licensing regime. Opium production would expand, with farmers taking payments 
from the government while continuing to supply illicit buyers. There are better prospects for 
licensing in small areas amenable to enforcement, although this would create an additional 
market without displacing the larger illegal one.8
 
Figure 5: Successful suicide attacks
Source: UN Department of Safety and Security (‘01–‘06); 
Pajhwak Afghan News Agency (‘07)
Figure 6: Proportion of total opium cultivation, 
by NATO regional command
Source: United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime
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Aid
Long-term stability in Afghanistan requires the establishment of a functional national 
government that receives public support. Foreign forces are not capable of such a feat; the 
most they can do is hold territory and protect infrastructure while others tend to governance.
Overseas development assistance to Afghanistan has been growing in response to 
perceptions that the volume of aid has been below what is required. Nevertheless, two 
trends have remained consistent. First, a majority of funding has bypassed government 
structures and been managed by NGOs, international organisations and private 
consultancies. The proportion spent without local administration has been around 70% of 
total commitments.
Second, the Afghan Government struggles to spend the money it does receive, disbursing 
50–80% of grants. Kabul’s pleas for more help are justifi ed, but it is a weak link in the 
assistance chain.
Both trends indicate a need to reconsider delivery mechanisms. Building government 
capacity to plan and implement development should be the aim. Unsustainable, 
foreign-managed interventions lacking interaction with local government do not help.
Australia’s aid contribution has increased substantially from a low base (see fi gure 8).9  
Early indications from the Rudd Government suggest that the 2007–08 estimate will be a 
minimum.
Figure 7: Opium cultivation and production
Source: United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime
Figure 8: AusAID expenditure in Iraq and Afghanistan
Source: AusAID budget papers
The modalities of Australian aid have also changed. Our early spending went almost entirely 
through the international donor funds for Afghanistan. With bigger budgets has come a 
mandate for AusAID to implement projects directly. Current policy is to focus heavily on 
Oruzgan in a whole-of-government approach to our area of military operations, although in 
dollar terms, spending there has been a minority.
AusAID only has one representative in Afghanistan. As it attempts to ramp up its program, 
a challenge is to ensure the security of staff. One solution is to place civilians under the 
protection of the military. Another solution has been adopted to protect four Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) offi cers—engage private security contractors.
There are signifi cant drawbacks to such arrangements. Private contractors are expensive 
and divert a sizeable portion of the budget from development to self-protection. 
Placing aid workers with the ADF might seem an attractive alternative, but costs re-appear 
as constraints on military operations. Regardless, either option reduces the effectiveness of 
aid—it’s diffi cult to build positive relationships and legitimacy when surrounded by 
machine guns. 
Furthermore, if aid workers mingle with armed foreigners they become valid targets to the 
insurgency. In contrast to Iraq, the ACM in Afghanistan has generally avoided development 
targets because attacks that reduce living standards undermine the legitimacy of resistance. 
There are three major exceptions to this rule. First, ACM legitimacy is derived locally, so 
out-of-area operations are acceptable. Second, faith-based NGOs and military 
reconstruction teams attract attacks regardless of their good intentions. Examples are the 
South Korean hostages from Saemmul Presbyterian Church and the British Army’s ongoing 
battle to refurbish the Kajaki Dam.
Third, some groups in the ACM consider criminal behaviour such as kidnapping justifi ed to 
fund their struggle—and Westerners are tempting targets. Compared to other confl ict zones, 
such behaviour has been surprisingly limited, but it remains a risk for any foreigner.
When considering these exceptions, the underlying reality is inescapable. In areas where 
the insurgency is active, violence and lawlessness affect everyone, be they locals, 
government employees, or aid workers. Surrounding development actors with armed 
personnel does not dispel the risk and may make it worse.
Fifteen years from now
The Taliban has succeeded in the primary aim of every insurgency—survival—and will 
maintain a threatening military strength for many years. Opium production will continue at 
a level that provides fi nancial power to the ACM and underpins southern resistance to rule 
from Kabul.
Events beyond Afghanistan will impact on its internal security and on how NATO perceives 
the confl ict, including developments in Iraq and the occurrence of major terrorist events. For 
the purposes of this Policy Analysis, Pakistan is an independent variable, and a grim one at 
that. Australia has limited leverage over events there, although we can advise 
better-positioned allies, such as the US. Pakistan is unlikely to make defi nitive progress 
in controlling its western borderlands for at least a decade. Areas of southern and eastern 
Afghanistan will therefore remain militarily unstable, narrowing the set of realistic coalition 
aims.
In fi fteen years time, Afghanistan is likely to be divided geographically. An optimistic vision 
sees the government in Kabul with a tangible writ across the north and west. Provincial 
leaders will respond to central directives because Kabul is delivering the benefi ts of 
international assistance. Opiate traffi cking will continue but production and processing 
will be minimal. These parts of Afghanistan—the majority—will resemble other very 
poor countries.
In the south and east, Pashtun provincial leaders will take part in national governance and 
several provinces will be passive. However, areas of Kandahar, Helmand and the eastern 
provinces that border Pakistan will suffer from insurgency. Insurgent formations of more than 
a handful of men will be rare and will be deterred by coalition air assets. IEDs, suicide 
attacks and opportunistic sniping and rocket fi re will occur. Territorial control will be 
contested in these areas and opium production will be intense.
In social spending and military support, the Afghan Government will still rely on international 
assistance. By then, it will have a capacity to absorb signifi cant donations and funnel them 
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into development outputs. A number of foreigners will work in-line but the government will 
have control over its development trajectory.
If dedicated hostility to government rule is corralled into enclaves in the south and east, a 
stalemate will ensue. As NATO’s military commitment wanes, Kabul will struggle to take the 
fi ght into hostile districts.
In Colombia, Myanmar and Moldova, rebellious areas with illicit revenues are diffi cult for 
governments. Nevertheless, confl ict is contained and the state can remain coherent. In the 
case of Afghanistan, donor funding will be necessary until there is improvement in Pakistan. 
A vision of fi fteen years hence sees the Afghan Government receiving economic assistance 
but shouldering the social and physical costs of sustaining itself. The ANA will plan and lead 
operations across Afghanistan. International forces will provide training, air support and, 
rarely, a long-range strike. Backed by a secure north and west, the government in Kabul will 
contain rebellion in the south and east.
The medium term
Outlining a vision for Afghanistan that sees it becoming a new Colombia or Moldova is not 
terribly inspiring or politically palatable. But NATO needs to be realistic, at least internally, 
about what it can achieve and at what pace. Squeezing the ACM into a few border areas 
would represent major progress, as would a north and west that responds to Kabul and 
supports national development plans.
To realise this vision, a 3–5 year strategy for military and civilian assistance should 
prioritise Afghan ownership. Aid programs have refl ected an emphasis on short-term action 
over the development of Afghan capacity. Now, donors need to complement direct delivery 
with improved government systems.
A major focus should be law and justice. Military manoeuvres and suicide bombers 
obscure the day-to-day insecurity locals experience across the country. Related to 
criminality and poverty, this is a much wider concern than massed confl ict. One of the 
Taliban’s key achievements was increased stability at the grassroots. Like most 
populations around the world, Afghans measure progress by gauging trends in their physical 
and economic security. Improving perceptions on this front is the best way to engender 
support for the government in Kabul.
On the military side, the ANA should lead in all regions by 2012. Kabul will not have 
complete territorial control, which means the ANA will still be conducting counter-insurgency 
and policing internal borders. A de facto partition of some southern and eastern provinces is 
likely. Geographically, Afghanistan may become a mirror image of Pakistan.
For the next 3–5 years, NATO needs to entrench positions around major settlements and 
across the buffer zones it controls. The confl ict should not degenerate into 
‘Pashtuns vs. the rest’—the continuing participation of Pashtun communities in national 
governance is important. 
ANA training should focus on internal defence, national solidarity and military policing 
against infi ltration and traffi cking. Cross-regional recruitment and rotations should continue. 
Many NATO members are likely to reduce their commitments, so the ANA must be prepared 
for less manoeuvrability and air support, but stronger command and control.
NATO should also make concerted effort to improve cross-border cooperation between the 
ANA and the Pakistani Army. One of the best outcomes of Afghanistan’s geographic division 
may be the demonstration of shared interests between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Border 
liaison offi cers, meet-and-greets and exercises at all levels would produce benefi ts for little 
cost. By 2012, the coalition should aim to institute a system of communication channels 
between border guards—radios, direct lines, regular meetings—wherever possible.
The Australian contribution
Seven considerations for Australian assistance follow. First, the ADF’s work to install Afghan 
contingents in fortifi cations in Oruzgan is a good idea and aligns with the strategy outlined 
above. However, it will be at least a few years until the ANA can hold the territory around 
these emplacements without direct assistance. The ADF should consider a localised 
mentoring role to build the ANA’s capacity for using its fortifi cations. Training must refl ect the 
reality of diminishing NATO ground support.
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Second, as the front line becomes an internally fortifi ed border, there will still be a role for 
ranging special forces patrols. Australian familiarity with Oruzgan suggests it would be our 
most effective area of operations. However, higher priorities could arise and if Australia’s 
military contribution becomes lighter, the ADF may need to integrate special forces more 
fully with our allies. Effective coordination with the ANA will become increasingly important.
Third, our aid program in Oruzgan should be tightly focused.  Acknowledging the province’s 
limited capacity to absorb assistance, we should prioritise basic infrastructure, such as 
roads, irrigation and electricity generation. We should use local contractors, minimise our 
security footprint, avoid association with the military and implement projects that reduce 
Oruzgan’s isolation. Over the next 3–5 years, we should strive to solidify those districts we 
control into a coherent territorial unit linked to central Afghanistan.
Fourth, Australia can help to bolster Kabul’s writ across the north and west. Umbrella or 
programmatic agreements with United Nations agencies are one way to deliver funds 
quickly—in law and justice, prime partners would be the United Nations Development 
Programme and the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime. However, international 
organisations are themselves struggling with capacity constraints. While cooperation in 
planning is advisable, showering them with extra money may be less effective than 
organising programs ourselves.
Fifth and following from this, there is a need to create and fi ll in-line positions with the 
national government. The Afghan state will stand or fall on its record of applying 
international funds to local development. Foreigners are presently the only way to bridge 
many capacity gaps. They should have the dual role of delivering government services and 
building a local team to take their place. Such methods are standard practice in 
development programs and they should be expanded in Afghanistan. It would be helpful to 
increase Afghans’ opportunities for professional training and education, including in 
Australia. A balance must be struck between building long-term capacity and ensuring that 
well-educated Afghans are available for government work.
Sixth, Australia could sponsor some districts that have eschewed opium. Basic 
infrastructure projects would be good value, with any combination of arms-length funding, 
hands-on project delivery or in-line administration with provincial governments. AusAID will 
need staff in-country and it will need to time these activities with the poppy cycle. Time is 
short—in some places the harvest begins in April.
Finally, there may be scope for a bigger AFP presence in areas where the insurgency is 
absent but law and order is weak. Some NATO militaries are currently conducting police 
training. This is potentially counter-productive—just as police would not be used to train 
infantry, soldiers are not suited to preparing a police force. Only coordinated donor funds 
and the right personnel will improve the situation.
The European Union (EU) has the lead on police and is integrating its members’ police 
assistance into a single mission. Australia should be wary of fragmentation between the 
police programs of the EU and the US Department of Defense. The AFP has shown some 
skill at improving executive police skills in developing countries. This could be a useful 
back-room niche for Australia at the national or provincial level, which would see less money 
diverted to self-protection. 
Looking forward
Over the next few months, NATO’s soul-searching must yield a coherent medium-term 
strategy to galvanise the alliance until a creditable outcome can be reached in Afghanistan. 
A long-term, realistic vision would help guide the process of moving Afghanistan’s 
government and military into positions of responsibility in the most insecure areas.
The Australian media will mostly follow events in Oruzgan, but our ability to bolster 
government legitimacy across the north and west will be equally important. Kabul needs 
stable, united territory from which to pressure an insurgency that will be active for as long as 
Pakistan is restive.
It’s not an ideal outcome, but if we can realise both aspects of this vision, we will have 
advanced our counter-terrorism agenda and achieved our alliance interests.
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November 2006; Nicole Naurath, ‘In Afghanistan, Views of Security Differ Starkly by Region,’ Gallup 
News Service, October 25, 2006; Stephen Weber, Afghan Public Opinion Amidst Rising Violence, 
December 14, 2006 for World Public Opinion.org; World Public Opinion.org, ‘Afghan Public 
Overwhelmingly Rejects al-Qaeda, Taliban’, January 2006, http://65.109.167.118/pipa/articles/
home_page/155.php?nid=&id=&pnt=1; Gary Langer, ‘Four Years After the Fall of the Taliban, Afghans 
Optimistic About the Future,’ ABC News December 7, 2005, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/PollVault/story?id=1363276.
5 Pajhwak Afghan News Agency, ‘2007 Ends with 137 Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan,’ 
http://www.afgha.com/?q=node/5510. Also killed were 171 Afghan policeman and 37 members of 
the ANA.
 
6 In 2001 the Taliban instituted a largely successful ban on opium cultivation. This is sometimes 
wrongly ascribed to a religious distaste for opium. Most analysts believe that the ban was imposed in 
order to collect a US reward and because the regime had stockpiled substantial amounts from 
previous harvests.
7 See for example Senlis Afghanistan, Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and 
Making Enemies, February 2007.
8 Health systems in both developing and developed countries under-prescribe medicinal opiates. Cost 
is part of the reason in developing countries. If an enforceable regime can be established in parts 
of Afghanistan, donors will need to fund opium purchases and distribute cheaply to poor countries’ 
health systems. Given the minimal impact it will have on the opium economy in Afghanistan and given 
that there is already a global surplus available for distribution, Australia does not have an interest in 
supporting this method of giving developing countries cheap opiates—including because Tasmania 
produces around half the world’s licit supply.
9 The fi gures for Iraq do not include debt forgiveness.
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